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CRIMINAL PnoCEDuRE-STANDING OF THB PREss TO PnoTEST Juoon's ExCLUSION OF THB Ptmuc FROM CRIMINAL TRIAL-Plaintiff newspapers sent
reporters to the trial of Minot Jelke. Defendant judge, exercising his discretion,
excluded them as well as the general public from the courtroom when testimony
dealing with the sordid details of prostitution and pandering was expected. The
family and friends of the accused, along with the officers of the court, witnesses
and jury were not excluded. Plaintiffs applied to the Supreme Court, Special
Term, of New York County for a writ of prohibition to restrain the defendant
from enforcing his order. The application for the writ was based on a statute
guaranteeing the accused in a criminal trial the right to a public trial.1 This
mandatory right2 is qualified by another statute listing specific exceptions to the
right of public trial in the interest of protecting public morals and decency.3
The application was denied on the grounds that the defendant had the power to
issue the exclusion order and that the Supreme Court, Special Term, could not
substitute its judgment for that of the defendant.4 On appeal, held, affirmed.
The guarantee of a public trial is personal to the parties to the trial and is not a
right of the public. While the public has an interest in a public trial, it is up
to the accused to assert or waive that right, and outsiders have no standing to
raise it. 5 No question of freedom of speech or of the press is involved because
these rights do not allow the press access to places not open to the general public
as well. United Press Association v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E. (2d) 777
(1954).

1 66 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) §8.
2People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931).
3 29 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) §4. The cases in which the trial judge can
exclude the public from the courtroom include rape, adultery, sodomy, and similar sexual
crimes. The case of People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. (2d) 769 (1954), decided
the same day as the principal case, held that the statute did not apply. Although evidence
of sodomy was to be introduced, the crime charged was not one of the listed crimes.
4 United Press Association v. Valente, 203 Misc. 220, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 642 (1953);
281 App. Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1953). These two decisions were noted in 52
MICm:. L. RP.v. 609 (1954).
5 It is said that a contrary holding would take control of the courtroom away from the
judge. State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S.W. 257 (1887); 15 Umv. Pn-r. L. REv. 385
(1954). This view apparently is based on an unflatteringly low opinion of the trial judge's
capability. 49 CoL. L. RP.v. 110 (1949).
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The right of the press as a member of the public to protest its exclusion from
a criminal trial does not seem to have been litigated before. This is explainable
on two grounds: (I) when an exclusionary order is given, the press is. not
normally included in the order;6 and (2) litigating the exclusion order is both
costly and time consuming~· while the news value of the trial is low at the time
the issue is finally decided. To maintain a statutory cause of action, a person
must show that he is a member of the class for whose interest or protection the
statute was enacted. Ever since Cooley stated that the right to a public trial
found in various state constitutions and statutes was for the benefit of the accused and not the public,7 courts have piled up reams of dicta to that effect.8
Cooley apparently based his statement on history for he cited no cases deciding
the question. The prestige of Cooley's name, combined with the passage of
time, have given such weight to this view that its reversal is unlikely. However, it is not obvious that Cooley's interpretation of history is correct. Bentham
saw the public trial as a public right intended to insure the proper administration of justice,9 and the English cases treat the right as one belonging to both
the defendant and the public.10 If, as has been stated,11 the public trial right
resulted from a distaste for such abuses of judical power as Star Chamber, the
Spanish Inquisition, and the French lettres de cachet, regard for the defendant
was not the reason for the insertion of the requirement in so many constitutions.
The real basis for the right lay in the fear of the judiciary becoming a means to
tyranny and despotism, and publicity was believed to be the answer to the evil.12
Some courts have used this historical background to define the word "public"
as meaning the opposite of in camera,13 so that if any disinterested party is
present at the trial it is said to be a public trial. However, this definition takes
only half the reason for the right. Other courts interpret the word "public'' to
mean a trial to which members of the public have freedom of access.14 These
courts accept Cooley's statements at face value and deny that there is any right
in the public to attend the trial. Along with the historical argument, the courts

6 The fact that the press was allowed to remain in court to observe the trial after the
exclusionary order is emphasized in many cases dealing with the question of whether the
defendant actually had a public trial. State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462
(1906); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916); Sullivan, "The Public
Interest in Public Trial,'' 25 PA. B.Q. 253 (1954).
7 CooLEY, CoNSnTIInONAL UMITATIONS, 8th ed., 647 (1927).
8 State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P. (2d) 1110 (1936); People v. Hartman, 103
Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894); 52 MICH. L. REv. 128 (1953).
9 BENTHAM, RATIONALE 01' JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827).
10 Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B. and C. 237, 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (1829).
11 See Justice Black's opinion in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948).
12 Jn re Oliver, note 11 supra; 67 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1953).
13State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142,217 P. 705 (1923); United States v. Kobli, (3d
Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 919; Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 172 P. 273 (1918).
14 State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212 (1844); Carter v. State, 99 Miss. 435, 54 S. 734
(1911).
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raise a questionable fear for public morals as a makeweight for their decisions.15
Query if this is not censorship by a few and, in reality, a poor reason for exclusion of the public. Realizing that there is no reason to overcrowd a courtroom, and that there are cases where the possible embarrassment to a witness
would call for a limitation of the number of gaping sensation seekers, the public
and its press representatives still have a legitimate interest in attending trials.
This interest has been denied on the authority of Cooley's name, history, and
"protection of public morals," without a close, critical appraisal of the rationale
of exclusion. Publicizing a trial is vital to both the defendant and the public,
especially in the criminal trial, and when a representative of the public asserts
that right it should not be denied solely on the ground that it is not the proper
party in interest.
M. Fred Mallender, II, S.Ed.

ll>Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 S. 101 (1921); Reagan v. United States, (9th Cir.
1913) 202 F. 488. See 6 WIGMORI!, EvmBNCE, 3d ed., §1835 (1940), for exclusionary
statutes and decisions based on injury to public morals.

